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Within a costly state veriﬁcation setting, we derive the optimal ﬁnancial contract
between an entrepreneur, a (potentially ﬁnancing) supervisor and a pure investor
when there is non veriﬁable and non contractible auditing and limited liability.
We show that in such circumstances diversion of cash ﬂows to the en-
trepreneur arises as optimal behaviour. In such cases it is crucial to have both
the supervisor and the pure investor participating ﬁnancially into the venture
with the role of creating correct reporting and monitoring incentives. This is
achieved by setting negatively correlated repayments: the contract uses the
pure investors to smooth out the repayments of the entrepreneur optimally.
This reduces the entrepreneur’s incentive to make false reports and mitigates
the supervisor’s incentive to monitor. This contract, as well as being Pareto
superior to a single investor contract, is shown to be always renegotiation-proof,
and, within a set of parameters, collusion-proof.
Keywords: ﬁnancial contracts, multiple investors, no commitment
JEL Nos: D82, D83Introduction
The recent wave of corporate scandals has brought to light quite widespread
malpractice in the accounting profession and limited control by the designated
auditors. The Worldcom or Enron scandals are only the most dramatic high
proﬁle scandals involving major U.S. corporations in recent years. Before En-
ron and Worldcom slid into bankruptcy, several high-proﬁle companies were
investigated for fraud by the SEC, and ultimately paid tens of millions of dol-
lars in ﬁnes to settle the charges. Waste Management, Cendant, Sunbeam and
MicroStrategy all faced federal scrutiny.
This paper argues that such malpractices can in some circumstances, e.g.
under limited liability or under contractual incompleteness, e.g. if audit is
insuﬃciently transparent, arise as optimal behaviour and proposes a role for
multiple investors to help limit the extent of such malpractices as well as a
more direct involvement of designated auditors in the ﬁnancing of the venture.
W em o d e las i t u a t i o ni nw h i c haﬁrm/entrepreneur seeks funding to ﬁnance
an investment project whose cash ﬂows are his private information but which
can be veriﬁed by a supervisor at a cost. The necessary funding can be provided
either by a pure investor or by the supervisor, or by both. The supervisor can
thus be a pure auditing company or an investor who also performs a monitoring
task, but we leave this to be determined endogenously.
It is well known that any contract with repayments which induces the en-
trepreneur to report its state truthfully has potential problems of commitment
to the monitoring policy written into the contract (Hart [1]): if the monitor
knows that the contract induces truthful reporting, she has no incentive to un-
dertake costly monitoring ex post. To obviate this problem here, we assume that
monitoring is non-contractible. This means that the contract has to regulate
two types of incentives: the incentive for the entrepreneur to reveal his private
information and the incentive for the supervisor to carry out the monitoring ex
post.
As well as non-contractible, we also assume that audits are neither observable
nor veriﬁable to outside parties. The reasons for these assumptions are the
following: ﬁrst, since monitoring involves randomisation by the supervisor, there
must be public display of the randomisation (i.e. even though the ﬁrm and
pure investor can compute the equilibrium probability of monitoring, to ensure
the supervisor actually uses this needs a public lottery); second, if the lottery
result dictates monitoring, then all three parties must be able to see that the
monitoring actually occurs. If either of these is not possible, then a further
source of contractual incompleteness arises.
Non-contractibility of monitoring is not a novel issue in the literature: it has
been studied by Jost [3] in a moral hazard setting and by Khalil [4] in an adverse
selection setting; Persons [9] and Khalil and Parigi [6] have instead focused
on the ﬁnancial contract between an entrepreneur and one or two investors.
The general ﬁnding is that there are two ways to give correct incentives to the
supervisor to carry out the audit ex post. One consists of “rewarding” the
supervisor whenever she monitors, i.e. increasing her payoﬀ by the amount of
1the observation cost, so as to make her indiﬀerent between monitoring and not
monitoring and hence inducing the entrepreneur to truthfully reveal his cash
ﬂows (Jost [3], Persons [9]). The other consists in having the entrepreneur
“misrepresenting” the true state, i.e. diverting cash ﬂows in the high state,
with a positive probability, thus using the possibility of collecting a penalty for
detected false reporting to give the supervisor an incentive to monitor (Khalil
[4], Khalil and Parigi [6], Persons [9]).
When the act of monitoring is not publicly observable, the ﬁrst of these
two alternatives, however, is not implementable. If the contract induces truth-
telling and the supervisor gets a premium for monitoring, then the supervisor
will always claim to have monitored (and discovered truth-telling) even when
she has not. To prevent this, no premium can ever be paid when monitoring
detects truth-telling. The incentive to monitor can thus arise only from the
possibility of collecting a penalty for detected false reporting, and a contract
inducing misrepresentation in equilibrium will arise, i.e. a contract in which
there is diversion of cash ﬂows.1
Although both Persons [9] and Khalil and Parigi [6] have derived the proper-
ties of the misrepresentation contract, they have focused on the bilateral case in
which the investor acts also as a monitor. There is widespread evidence, though,
that ﬁrms do not contract with just a single party, but rather with various par-
ties, and in particular with multiple investors. We attempt to explain this by
studying a simpliﬁed setting in which there is at least in principle a division of
tasks: the entrepreneur has the skills to carry out the project, the pure investor
and the supervisor each have the funding to ﬁnance it and only the supervisor
has the monitoring technology to verify the entrepreneur’s report.
We show that among the misrepresentation contracts, those with three par-
ties are always preferable to those with two. In particular a ﬁrm-supervisor-
investor contract always dominates a bilateral structure in which the supervisory
role coincides with the ﬁnancing role. However there is no full specialisation of
tasks, in the sense that it is still optimal to have the supervisor providing a share
of ﬁnance and have the “pure” investor providing the balance. Thus, even if the
pure investor is wealthy enough to ﬁnance the entire project and all parties are
risk neutral, it is optimal to ask the supervisor to participate in the ﬁnancing
as this allows the entrepreneur to reduce his incentive to cheat, thus mitigating
the supervisor’s incentives for monitoring and reducing the overall observation
cost. In practical terms this means that auditors should have a ﬁnancial stake
in the ﬁrms they audit.
Given our setup, the tool for controlling these incentives is the structure
of repayments to the pure investor. It is a standard result in models of this
type (e.g. Khalil [4], Khalil and Parigi [6]) that to induce the supervisor to
monitor, the repayments she receives must be increasing in the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow.
1The assumption of non veriﬁability of monitoring is not crucial to get misrepresentation
contracts. Even if the act of monitoring were publicly observable and veriﬁable, the implemen-
tation of a truthtelling contract could be shown to rely either on unlimited liability or, when
there is limited liability, on low state revenues being suﬃciently high to cover the observation
cost.
2Analogously, to induce the entrepreneur to comply, he must be given a rent for
truthful reporting. We show that the repayments to the pure investor can be
used to enhance these two incentive eﬀects: by setting them to be decreasing in
the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows -in the high cash ﬂo ws t a t et h ep u r ei n v e s t o rg e t sar e p a y -
ment lower than the one she gets in the low cash ﬂow state- the entrepreneur
can increase the rent he gets for compliance, as well as the premium paid to the
monitor for detected misreporting, thus mitigating his own incentive to cheat
and consequently the supervisor’s incentive to monitor. This results in lower
expected monitoring costs compared to either a setting in which there is a single
investor who has also a monitoring task (no specialisation) or the scenario in
which tasks are separated (full specialisation). We cannot get such a high pow-
ered incentive scheme in either of the other cases considered -full specialisation,
no specialisation- as the spread of total repayments to the supervisor and the
pure investor is always higher than that achieved with a supervisor who also
acts as a ﬁnancier.
We thus argue that when some form of contractual incompleteness (un-
veriﬁability of monitoring) prevents the attainment of solutions with truthful
revelation, diversion of cash ﬂows arises as optimal behaviour. Under such
circumstances, it is crucial to have both the supervisor and the pure investor
participating ﬁnancially in the venture to get the best possible reporting and
monitoring incentives. In reality most economies regulate to prevent auditors
from having ﬁnancial stakes in the companies they audit. For example the
UK Companies Act 1985 prevents any creditor or equityholder from acting as
an auditor of the ﬁrm. It follows from our results that this concern may be
misguided.
It is worth noting that our rationale for the desirability of multiple parties is
solely in terms of improving incentives for truthtelling and monitoring. Since we
have assumed that all parties are risk neutral, there are no risk diversiﬁcation
gains from multiple investors; by contrast it is risk aversion which motivates
diversiﬁcation in most of the literature. But even with risk aversion we would
expect that these incentive eﬀects will remain.
A last remark concerns the robustness of this contract to collusion and
renegotiation possibilities. In particular, costly monitoring raises the issue of
whether the parties have an incentive to renegotiate the terms of the contract
ex post to save the monitoring costs, where by renegotiation we mean a revision
of the repayments and/or the players strategies that leads to a Pareto improve-
ment. We ﬁnd that there is no room in our setting for such renegotiations.
This is in contrast with Krasa and Villamil [8], who on these grounds show the
superiority of deterministic contracts over stochastic contracts. We will argue
that this has to do with the particular setting analysed by Krasa and Villamil.
Moreover generally in the literature it is recognised that truthtelling contracts
which are not completely pooling are prone to renegotiation (Persons [9]).
Of course, with more than two parties, a renegotiation of the terms of the
contract could also involve two of the parties at the expense of the third one,
thus taking the form of a collusive agreement. Due to the particular structure
of repayments, we ﬁnd that this may occur only between the supervisor and the
3entrepreneur, but that there is a range of parameters where no such collusive
agreement can be reached.
The plan of the paper is to outline the model assumptions in section 1; in
section 2 to derive the various forms of second best contract with two investors;
in section 3 to derive the implications in terms of collusion and renegotiation;
in section 4 to analyse monotonic contracts and in the last section to conclude.
1 The Model Assumptions
The risk neutral entrepreneur seeks funding to ﬁnance an investment project of
ﬁxed size D which gives him access to a technology in which revenues depend
on the state of nature f(s)=fs with s ∈ {H,L} and fH >f L. State s = H
occurs with probability p.
Revenues are private information to the entrepreneur and are unobservable
to any party. We assume that the supervisor has the technology to monitor, at
ac o s tφ,a sw e l la st h er e s o u r c e st oﬁnance the project, and that the result of
an audit is neither observable nor veriﬁable to any other party. Moreover we
assume that the entrepreneur can raise ﬁnance from a pure risk neutral investor
who has no incentive problems. The shares of funding α and 1 − α provided
by each potential investor are determined endogenously and for each group the
opportunity cost of capital is equal to r.
A remark is warranted regarding the terminology. We will throughout deﬁne
the supervisor as the monitoring investor, although at this point this labelling
is abusive, as we don’t know yet whether the supervisor participates ﬁnancially
in the venture. Nevertheless, this allows us to keep in mind that she has the
resources to ﬁnance the project. It will in fact turn out that it is optimal to
have her providing a share of ﬁnance under limited liability.
Participation in the venture pays a non negative return of Rs to the monitor-
ing investor and Ps to the pure investor, depending on the state and on whether
it is audited. They are thus protected by limited liability. We also require the
ﬁrm to be solvent in each state: fs − Rs − Ps ≥ 0 so that the ﬁrm itself has
limited liability.2
When there is asymmetric information, the monitoring investor can choose
to audit any state report of the ﬁrm; and, if she does so, she must pay an
observation cost of φ. We allow the monitoring investor to randomly monitor
the low state report with an endogenous probability m.3 If it is found that the
entrepreneur has falsely declared the low cash ﬂow state instead of the high true
state then, as well as paying the returns due in the high state, it is punished by
paying an amount that is speciﬁed in the contract to the investors.
Risk neutrality of each party and the existence of a perfect capital market
imply that there are neither risk sharing issues nor liquidity constraints. Because
of this we can measure the relative ineﬃciency of diﬀerent contracts by their
2Otherwise the model would not be ﬁnancially closed; the ﬁrm could always pay anything
required perhaps by expost borrowing, which makes the issue investigated unimportant.
3There is no gain here to monitoring a high state report.
4expected observation cost: those with lower expected observation cost are ex-
ante preferable, if they enable ﬁnancing.
We assume that the ﬁxed ﬁnancing requirement is such that
fL < (1 + r)D; (A.1)
otherwise the ﬁrm could just pay a constant repayment to the investors in each
state s and meet their participation constraints, have no reporting incentive
problem and face no monitoring. Under this assumption, a feasible contract
will require either Rs or Ps t ov a r yb ys t a t e ,w h i c hi nt u r ni n d u c e si n c e n t i v e
constraints on the entrepreneur and on the monitoring investor.
Last, in line with the existing literature, we assume that the investment is
socially proﬁtable:
pfH +( 1− p)fL − (1 + r)D − φ > 0, (A.2)
i.e. the expected return from the project is suﬃciently high to cover the obser-
vation cost φ.
The entrepreneur oﬀers a contract R to the monitoring investor and a con-
tract P to the pure investor specifying all possible contingent transfers covering
all veriﬁable states of the world. When monitoring occurs, it reveals only to
the monitor whether the entrepreneur cheated or whether he told the truth, i.e.
whether cash ﬂows are truly low or high. To communicate the result of moni-
toring credibly to other parties (other investors, courts or the ﬁrm) the monitor
must be able to produce hard, informative evidence of the ﬁrms ﬁnancial posi-
tion. When the state is truly low there is no such available evidence - the best
the monitor can do is replicate the ﬁrms own report. This implies that follow-
ing a low state report the repayments cannot be made contingent on whether
monitoring occurred, i.e. cannot have RLL >R L, where RLL is the payoﬀ the
supervisor gets if monitoring detects compliance whereas RL is the payoﬀ the
supervisor gets if there is no monitoring following a low state report. If so, the
supervisor would always claim to have monitored even when she has not and
ask for the corresponding repayment RLL >R L. Thus non-observability implies
that RLL = RL and by the same token that PLL = PL.
However when the true state is high, there is hard evidence available - despite
the low report of the ﬁrm, the monitor can show that the ﬁrms revenues are
actually high.
One way of interpreting this setup is to think of the accounting books as
being available to all parties, so that monitoring a true low state report simply
conﬁrms what is written in the books and is no proof that an inspection did
actually take place. Since the pure investor does not know whom to trust
(especially given that repayments following a true low state report contingent
on monitoring imply that PLL <P L, and thus the pure investor has no reason
to trust the monitor), low state repayments cannot be made contingent on
monitoring. When the ﬁrm cheats instead, the monitor can provide evidence of
fraud by showing a discrepancy between the accounts (fL)a n dt h et r u ec a s h
ﬂows (fH). It is this discrepancy that proves that monitoring did occur.
5The structure of repayments is as follows: if the low state occurs the en-
trepreneur declares it and pays RL,P L to the monitoring and to the pure in-
vestor respectively independently of whether monitoring occurs or not. If the
high state occurs the entrepreneur can either declare it and pay RH,P H to the
investors or can falsely declare the low state, in which case his report is mon-
itored with probability m. If monitored and caught cheating the entrepreneur
pays RHL = RH +δR to the monitoring investor, i.e. what she had a right to if
a truthful report had been made, plus the penalty for misreporting δR ≥ 0,a n d
PHL = PH + δP to the pure investor, i.e. what she had a right to if a truthful
report had been made, plus the penalty for misreporting δP ≥ 0;l a s t ,i fn o t
monitored, again the entrepreneur pays RL,P L.
Distinguishing between two stages of the game, the time line is the following:
• Ex-ante stage.
— At time zero a ﬁnancial contract is oﬀered by the entrepreneur to the
monitoring and to the pure investors specifying the repayments due
in each monitored or non monitored state.
— At time one production takes place and at time two the state of
nature is realised and observed by the entrepreneur.
• Ex-post stage.
— At time three the entrepreneur sends a public report to the investors
and the monitoring one decides whether to verify the report. These
strategies are chosen as mutual best responses.
— At time four, conditional on the reported state and on the result of
monitoring, if any, the relevant transfers are made.
At the ex-post stage the decision variable for the ﬁrm is the probability l with
which it falsely declares the low state when the high state H has occurred. For
the monitoring investor, the decision variable is the probability m with which
she will audit the entrepreneur’s low state report ˆ L. As standard in models
of this type (e.g. in Khalil [4]), we assume that the entrepreneur never cheats
when the low state occurs; and the investor never monitors when a high state
report is received. Then, the expected returns to the two parties are:
EπE|H =( 1 − l)(fH − RH − PH)+lm(fH − RH − δR − PH − δP)+(1)
l(1 − m)(fH − RL − PL),
EπR|ˆ L = m[
pl
1 − p + pl
(RH + δR)+
1 − p
1 − p + pl
RL − φ]+( 1− m)RL, (2)




m0 EπR|ˆ L (4)
6and we have omitted the sunk cost of the loan size made at time zero from the
monitoring investors expected return. Recall that δ = δR + δP is the penalty
for misreporting and thus RH + δR and PH + δP are the repayments due to
the monitor and to the pure investor respectively when a low state report is
discovered to be false.
2 The misrepresentation contract
As we have argued in the previous section, the lack of commitment and the
non-observability of monitoring imply that a truth-telling contract cannot be
implemented. An alternative would be to provide the incentive to monitor
outside the contract and in the form of the gains to the monitor from punish-
ing a misreporting ﬁrm who is detected. The monitoring incentive is therefore
obtained by allowing the supervisor to sometimes collect a punishment repay-
ment from a lying ﬁrm. Thus, under non-observable monitoring, the incentive
constraints (3) and (4) become indiﬀerence conditions associated with a mixed
strategy equilibrium:
RH + PH − RL − PL = m(RH + δR + PH + δP − RL − PL) (5)
pl
1 − p + pl
(RH + δR)+
1 − p
1 − p + pl
RL − φ = RL. (6)
and the Nash equilibrium is:
l =
(1 − p)φ
p(RH + δR − RL − φ)
; (7)
m =
RH + PH − RL − PL
RH + δR + PH + δP − RL − PL
. (8)
Then 0 <m<1 requires RH+δR+PH+δP >R H+PH and RH+PH >R L+PL;
0 <l<1 requires RH + δR − RL − φ/p > 0.I ft h ei n v e s t o r - ﬁrm contract does
not satisfy these conditions, then no interior mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
is possible.
Thus, given a subsequent mixed strategy equilibrium, we can write the con-
tract problem CG as one of choosing Rs,P s, α to:
max p(fH − PH − RH)+( 1− p)(fL − PL − RL) (9)
st α(1 + r)D ≤ p(1 − l)RH +( 1− p + pl)RL (10)
(1 − α)(1 + r)D ≤ (p − pl + plm)PH + plmδP +( 1− p + pl − plm)PL (11)
fH − RH − δR − PH − δP ≥ 0 (12)
fL − RL − PL ≥ 0 (13)
RH + δR >R L (14)
and to (7) and (8).
The constraints have the usual meaning: (10) and (11) are the individual
rationality constraints for the monitor and for the pure investor respectively,
7(12) and (13) are the feasibility conditions, (7) and (8) are respectively the
probability of lying and the probability of monitoring determined at the ex-post
stage; last (14) is the supervisor reporting incentive constraint ensuring that
when the audit reveals noncompliance the supervisor has no incentive to hide
the result of the audit and claim not to have audited.
Solving programme CG, we derive the following properties of the optimal
contract (the technical details are in the appendix).
Proposition 1 With a subsequent mixed strategy, the optimal three-party con-
tract has:
i. investors getting their reservation utility level;
ii. maximum punishment: δR = fH − RH − PH, with δP =0 ;
iii. zero rent to the ﬁrm in the low state however it reports (fL = RL+PL),b u t
positive rent in the high state with truthful reports (fH − RH − PH > 0).
Result (i) is not surprising: since the ﬁrm is writing the contract it has no
gain from leaving any rent to either investor: if it did, it could reduce either P
or R in a way that leaves the other constraints preserved.
Maximum punishment reduces the incentive of the ﬁrm to cheat and so the
frequency of low state reports and, for given m, the amount of monitoring that
will be undertaken, thus saving on monitoring costs. Put slightly diﬀerently,
given that there is a mixed strategy equilibrium, the penalty for misreporting
δ = δR + δP only enters the contract problem via the participation constraints
of the investors through l. Raising the punishment reduces l and reduces the
impact of the participation constraint.
Similarly, punishment payments are crucial to the monitoring incentive of
the supervisor but are only important to the pure investor in meeting her partic-
ipation constraint. So it is most eﬃcient to give all the reward to the supervisor
and set δP =0 .
Last, binding low state feasibility is a common result in agency problems
that assists in ensuring incentive compatibility.
Given maximum punishment, binding low state feasibility and δP =0 ,w e
can set RH +PH = fH −δR, and RL = fL −PL. Using the monitoring investor
participation constraint to eliminate RH, the problem reduces to choosing PH,
PL and α to:
max pδR (15)
st µPH +( 1− µ)PL =( 1− α)(1 + r)D (16)
where µ = p − pl + plm and
δR = fH − PH − fL + PL +
(fL − PL − α(1 + r)D)
p(1 − l)
. (17)
Note that since pδR = p(1 − m)(fH − fL) maximising pδR is equivalent to
minimising the probability of monitoring. We then have:
8Theorem 1 Any contract which supports a mixed strategy, that has maximum
punishment and binding low state feasibility has PH <P L.
The formal proof of the theorem is in the appendix but the line of the
argument goes as follows. First note that the passive investors participation
constraint (16) must bind. Write the objective pδR and the participation con-
straint (16) in terms of the three variables ∆P = PH −PL,P L,α. Then as PL or
α increase (given ∆P), pδR falls whilst the passive investors constraint becomes
less tight with repayments (the LHS) increasing relative to the outstanding debt
(the RHS). Hence if the constraint were slack, a decrease in PL (and since ∆P
is constant, also in PH) would be possible without violating the constraint, but
l e a d i n gt oaf a l li nm and so an increase in the objective.
So we can use the passive investors participation constraint to eliminate α
which we write as a function of ∆P = PH −PL and PL. Using this function for
α the resulting value of m depends only on ∆P. The problem then becomes one
of choosing ∆P,PL to minimise m under the constraints that 0 <l ,m<1,a n d
feasibility in the form fL = RL + PL,f H ≥ RH + PH. At the solution:
l =
(1 − p)φ
p(fH − fL − ∆P − φ)
(18)
m =
((1 + r)D − fL)(fH − fL − ∆P − φ)






((1 + r)D − fL)(1 − p)φ
2
[∆Pφ(1 − p)+p(fH − fL)2 − (φ + p∆P)(fH − fL)]
2 > 0. (20)
Since m is increasing in ∆P this requires minimising ∆P. Hence any mixed
strategy optimum must involve ∆P<0 or PH <P L.
At ﬁrst sight this result seems surprising; it arises because the pure investor
gets caught up in the incentive problem, in the sense that the repayments she
gets can be used to sharpen the incentives that have to be provided in the
contract to the entrepreneur and to the supervisor. Partly the repayments
she gets aﬀect the incentive compatibility of monitoring; partly they aﬀect the
probability with which the high transfer will be made. The monitoring investor
receives transfer in the good state higher than the one received in the bad state.
The pure investor receives a bad state return higher than that received in the
good state. By making the payments negatively correlated with the proﬁts of
the ﬁrm and with the repayments to the monitoring investor, the spread in the
retained surplus of the ﬁrm between truthfully reported high states (fH −RH)
and non-monitored false reports of low states (fH −fL) is reduced. By reducing
the variability of the net proﬁt received across monitored and non-monitored
states, the ﬁrm reduces its incentive to cheat when the high state occurs and
mitigates the investor’s incentive to monitor.
With limited liability on both the monitoring investor and the pure investor
all repayments should be nonnegative. Then, given the negative correlation
9result established in Theorem 1, the upper bound on PL is fL with RL =0 .
Similarly the lower bound on PH is 0 with RH + δR = fH. Hence the optimal
contract has RL = PH =0 ,R H > 04 with a subsequent Nash equilibrium in






(fH − φ)((1 + r)D − fL)
p(fH − fL)fH − φ(fH − pfL)
. (22)




(1 + r)D(fH − fL)(fH − φ) − (1 − p)fL(f2
H − fHfL + φfL)
¤
(1 + r)D[fH(p(fH − fL) − φ)+pφfL](fH − φ)
.
(23)
In the appendix we show that all of these are in the interior of the unit interval,
in particular 0 < α < 1. The intuition for this result is the following: given that
the contract oﬀer comes from the entrepreneur, non trivial contracts “strength-
ening” the incentive to monitor require the supervisor to get in either state of
nature non-negative transfers which are increasing in the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows. This
implies that the supervisor is to receive a positive transfer in expected terms,
which is costly to the entrepreneur. By giving her a share of ﬁnance it is pos-
sible to hold her down to her reservation utility while ensuring that she has an
incentive to monitor.
2.1 Two special cases of the misrepresentation contract
It is worth comparing these results with those we would obtain in the two
extreme cases in which either the project is entirely ﬁnanced by the supervisor
or these functions are separated and assigned to two distinct agents.
The case in which α =0can be interpreted as one in which the parties
specialise, i.e. one acts as a monitor and the other as an investor.
Since the entrepreneur is not willing to give up any rent to the supervisor,
the only contract that he is ready to oﬀer is one which has zero payoﬀ in all
states which either are not monitored, or if monitored are found to be true, and
a positive payoﬀ only when a false low state report is detected. The supervisor
will accept such an oﬀer since, with RH = RL =0 ,i tt r i v i a l l ys a t i s ﬁes the
participation constraint (10) and, so long as (7) holds, i.e. plδR =( 1− p +
pl)φ, keeps her indiﬀerent between monitoring and not monitoring. Using the
superscript s to denote the separation of tasks, we derive the following properties
of the optimal contract (the technical details are in the appendix):
Proposition 2 The optimal contract with specialisation (α =0 )h a st h ef o l -
lowing features:
4The value of RH is given in the appendix.
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Thus we see that the supervisor gets a positive repayment only when she
detects cheating, in which cases maximum punishment is imposed; in all other
states she gets zero payoﬀs. The investor gets repayments which are increasing
in the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow,5 and by the same argument as in Proposition 1 above,
she gets no share of the penalty for misreporting, i.e. δP =0 .
The case in which α =1is related to Khalil and Parigi [6] who study the
contract between an entrepreneur and a single investor. If α =1then with
limited liability and the requirement that the pure investor should receive no
rent because of binding participation, any contract that is optimal given α =1
will have PH = PL =0and then eﬀectively there is a single investor. Adding a
superscript 1 to the variables to denote the presence of a single investor/monitor,










p(fH − fL − φ)
(24)
m1 =
((1 + r)D − fL)(fH − fL − φ)
[p(fH − fL) − φ](fH − fL)
(25)
In both the above cases the value of α is chosen exogenously. However from
(23) we know that optimally 0 < α < 1 a n ds oi tm u s tb et h a tac o n t r a c ti n
which the supervisor also acts as a ﬁnancier dominates any other contract in
which either there is full specialisation of tasks or there is no specialisation (and
the supervisor is the sole investor). In more detail we can see why this so in the
following corollary.
Corollary 1 ms,m 1 >mand ls >l 1 >l ,that is the two investor misrepre-
sentation contract with limited liability has a lower monitoring probability and
a lower cheating probability than either of the specialised cases. Consequently it
has lower expected observation costs.
Intuitively the reasons why the separation of functions does not work very
well in giving the correct incentives are that:
• for monitoring, the need to keep monitoring low to save on observation
costs requires the smallest possible spread in PH −PL (which implies that
PL = fL), but then the participation constraint of the pure investor who
is providing all the ﬁnance still requires such a large repayment in the high
state that it is not possible to keep the chance of monitoring low.
5The value of Ps
H is given in the appendix.
11• under separation the only endogenous element that aﬀects the incentives
for cheating is the size of the punishment repayment δ = δR + δP. The
higher this is the lower the cheating. But, given limited liability, its upper
limit fH −PH is constrained by the need to pay enough (PH) to the pure
investor to satisfy her participation constraint. If the ﬁnance is shared
then there is not the need to keep PH so high since the pure investor
requires a lower return.
The reasons why a single investor/monitor does not work as well as two
investors are:
• with just a single investor/monitor there is no need to pay positively cor-
related returns to the pure investor (PH >P L > 0) as is the case when
α =0 . In particular with a single investor/monitor PH = PL =0 . As a re-
sult the punishment for detected misreporting δR is larger, which reduces
cheating: l1 <l s. But it is possible to do still better by bringing in the
pure investor and giving her negatively correlated repayments since the
eﬀective punishment depends on fH − PH − RH. By having PH =0the
loss from detection after cheating as compared with the gain from getting
away with it is smaller. So l<l 1 <l s;
• making a positive transfer to the pure investor in the low state (PL > 0)
subtracts resources from the supervisor (RL decreases) and, to preserve
participation, requires an increase in transfers due in false detected low
states (RH + δR increases). On the other hand, making a lower transfer
t ot h ep u r ei n v e s t o ri nt h eh i g hs t a t e( PH <P L) increases the resources
retained by the entrepreneur in truthfully reported high state, the only
state in which he gets a rent. The higher rent mitigates the ﬁrm’s incentive
to lie (l falls) and along with the rise in RH + δR slackens the monitor’s
incentive constraint (m falls). So m<m 1.
Here we give an example of how much it is possible to gain by having a
monitoring investor with parameters p =0 .52,f H =1 0 ,f L =2 , φ =2 .1,
(1 + r)D =3 . With PL = fL,P H =0 ,δP =0 , because of limited liability,
we have m = .34,l= .24, α = .62,R H =4 .77,R L =0 . In this numerical
example the functions m and l as a function of the spread ∆P are plotted in the
accompanying diagram. The value of the objective function is pδR =2 .72 and
the expected return to the monitor is p(1 − l)RH =1 .87. I nt h es i n g l ei n v e s t o r
contract in which the project is ﬁnanced entirely by the supervisor, using the
same parameter values we get l1 = .33,m 1 = .36,R 1
H =4 .86 and optimal
expected utility for the entrepreneur pδ
1
R =2 .67. In the specialised case instead







Fig. 1. l,m as a function of ∆P
3 Collusion and renegotiation
So far, we have not analysed collusion or renegotiation problems that might
arise in this setting. Generally the literature has focused on those arising in a
principal-supervisor-agent hierarchy (Tirole [11], Khalil and Lawarrée [5], Kof-
man and Lawarrée [7], Strausz [10]). Unlike the existing literature, the present
paper looks at issues of collusion, as well as renegotiation when the supervisor
also acts as a principal by providing funding to the agent. We think of collusion
as involving two parties to the contract who agree to a deal between themselves
at the expense of the third party at the interim stage once the entrepreneur
knows his type. There are then diﬀerent coalitions that could form: between
the two investors, between the monitor and the ﬁrm or between the ﬁrm and the
passive investor. By contrast we think of renegotiation as involving a Pareto
improvement for all three parties again at the interim stage, so that for the
ﬁrm it is in terms of ex-post utilities, since it knows its type, whereas for the
investors it is in terms of ex-ante utilities conditional on any oﬀer that is made.
Since all these deals are done at the interim stage prior to any report of the
ﬁrm, once any oﬀer is made all parties can update their information and their
best strategies conditional on the oﬀer. Since the strategies are determined si-
multaneously in the game (reporting and monitoring are simultaneous), this is
the most informative time at which an oﬀer can be made.
3.1 Collusion
Collusion will typically involve a renegotiation of the terms of the contract
between the two colluding parties leading to outcomes which are at the cost of
13the third party. What sort of collusions/renegotiations can be made? Recall
the information assumptions: the original contract repayments Rs,P s and α are
common knowledge together with the exogenous parameters such as φ,p,f s.S o
all three parties can work out l,m.
Although the act of audit is neither observable, nor veriﬁable, the structure
of repayments is such that if an audit occurs, either their results have no ef-
fect on repayments or they become public information. When the low state
occurs, monitoring has no eﬀect on repayments, as these are not contingent on
monitoring. When the high state occurs and the ﬁrm reports low, monitoring
r e q u i r e st h es u p e r v i s o rt od i s c l o s et h er e s u l to ft h ea u d i tt og e tt h er i g h tt o
the premium for detected misreporting. Thus all parties, in particular the pure
investor who is uninformed on whether there has been an audit, get to know all
relevant information.
The ﬁrms state at the interim stage is its private information and the actual
repayments the ﬁrm makes to either investor are private information of the ﬁrm
and the respective investor. Outsiders to any collusion or renegotiation deal do
not know there has been a deal or what it is but have the enforceable right to
the repayment due in the original contract after any audit or report by the ﬁrm.
A collusive agreement between the non monitoring investors and the ﬁrm is
impossible. From the original contract a true high type ﬁrm who reports high
h a sa ne x p e c t e dr e t u r no fEπE|H =( fH − RH)=( 1− m)(fH − fL) whilst the
passive investor has an expected return of 0. If the ﬁrm stays with the original
contract and reports the truth it should pay 0 to the passive investor and RH to
the monitor. Since m is independent of the passive investor there is no room for
negotiation between the ﬁrm and the passive investor. Conversely if the high
type ﬁrm cheats and reports low, under the original contract it should pay fL to
the passive investor and 0 to the monitor if not monitored, or if it is monitored
and punished, pay 0 to the passive investor and fH to the monitor. The return
to the ﬁrm is then m(0) + (1 − m)(fH − fL)=( 1− m)(fH − fL). The passive
investor does not know the true state of the ﬁrm or whether it will be monitored
s oi t se x p e c t e dr e t u r na f t e ral o wr e p o r ti splm(0)/(1−p+pl)+(1−p+pl(1−
m))fL/(1 − p + pl). No bargaining is possible over PL = fL since changing PL
aﬀects the two payoﬀsi nd i ﬀerent directions. A cut in m would beneﬁtb o t h
parties but m is not under their control. A low type ﬁrm should pay the passive
investor PL = fL so the latter will not agree to colluding with the ﬁrm to tell
the monitor that it is high type.
Similarly because the repayments to the passive and monitoring investor
are negatively correlated the two investors cannot collude. Even if they could
force truth-telling from the ﬁrm the passive investor would like the ﬁrm to cheat
whereas the monitor would like the ﬁrm to be honest.
So the only possible collusion is between the ﬁrm and the monitor and takes
the form of giving the ﬁrm an incentive to report high for sure which allows a
zero repayment to the passive investor.
By following the original contract the high type gets (1−l)(fH −RH)+l(1−
m)(fH − fL)=fH − RH given the Nash equilibrium, while the low type gets
zero. On the other hand the expected payoﬀ to the monitor from following this
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m[plfH − (1 − p + pl)φ]+p(1 − l)RH
= p(1 − l)RH (26)
since by (21) [plfH −(1−p+pl)φ]=0 . Thus the collusive oﬀers can either come
from the monitor or from the ﬁrm and the payoﬀsa r e :
• pRH(1 − l) for the monitor
• fH − RH for the high type ﬁrm
• 0 for the low type ﬁrm.
To determine which oﬀers will be made and whether they will be accepted,
the relative sizes of p(1−l)RH,R H,f L are important. We know that fL <R H
since
fL − RH = −
(fH − fL)(fH − φ)((1 + r)D − fL)
(pf2
H − pfHfL − φfH + pφfL)
< 0
but the relation of p(1 −l)RH and fL is ambiguous. We therefore consider two
possible rankings according to whether
p(1 − l)RH S fL (27)
and we derive the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Collusion between the ﬁrm and the monitor at the interim stage
b e f o r et h eg a m ei sp l a y e di si m p o s s i b l ei ffL ≤ p(1−l)RH no matter who initiates
the collusion.
The detailed demonstration is in the appendix. The intuition is as follows:
suppose it is the monitor who makes a take it or leave it oﬀer to allow the ﬁrm
to repay b in exchange for no monitoring. If the ﬁrm accepts b is paid, the ﬁrm
reports ˆ H and pays PH =0to the passive investor. If the ﬁrm rejects, the
ﬁrm and/or the monitor can revise their cheating/monitoring strategies if they
wish, then the ﬁrm sends a report, any audit is carried out and the contract
payments are made. If p(1−l)RH <f L the monitor can make an oﬀer b = fL−ε
that both types of ﬁrm will accept. This is the only oﬀer the monitor will be
willing to make that would be accepted by either type. On the other hand if
fL <p (1 − l)RH there is no acceptable oﬀer that the monitor can make-any
oﬀer b>p (1 − l)RH will lead to the high type pooling with the low type.
Next suppose it is the ﬁrm who makes the oﬀer which has the form: “I’ll
pay you b and I’ll report high”. The low type can only aﬀord to oﬀer b<f L,
while the high type can oﬀer b<R H. So long as b>f L,t h eo ﬀer will be
type revealing. If the monitor accepts, b is paid, a high report is made and
PH =0is paid to the passive investor. If the monitor rejects, both the ﬁrm and
the monitor can revise their cheating/audit strategies if they wish, the game is
15played and the contract payments are made. If p(1 − l)RH <f L <R H both
types of ﬁrm can gain from an oﬀer b = p(1 − l)RH + ² which is accepted by
the monitor. However if fL <p (1 − l)RH an acceptable oﬀer will reveal that
the ﬁrm is of high type which will lead the monitor to reject and revise her
monitoring strategy. But then the high type will not make this oﬀer.
The numerical example underlying Fig. 1 is not actually collusion proof since
the expected return to the monitor (1.87) is below the low state revenue (2.0).
However if we just change p to 0.6 but keep the other parameters unchanged
the expected return to the monitor becomes 2.044 a n di st h e na b o v et h el o w
state revenue so that the contract is then collusion proof.
3.2 Renegotiation
By renegotiation we mean a revision of the repayments and/or the cheating and
audit strategies that leads to a Pareto improvement at the interim stage, i.e.
none of the three parties lose out. If we take the situation after the ﬁrm knows
i t st y p eb u tb e f o r et h er e p o r ta n da u d i t ,t h e na sb e f o r et h eh i g ht y p ee x p e c t s
to get RH, the low type 0, by (26) the monitor p(1 − l)RH from the original
contract and the passive investor expects (1−p+pl−plm)fL. Since the interests
of the low type and the passive investor are diametrically opposed, oﬀers can
only involve either changes in l or in RH or in m.
Suppose it is the monitor who makes a renegotiation oﬀer, in particular,
suppose that in exchange for m0 =0the monitor oﬀers e,P0: to be acceptable
t oal o wt y pet h eo ﬀer should satisfy e ≥ p(1−l)RH; e+P0 ≤ 0,P0 ≥ (1−p+pl)fL
leading to p(1−l)RH+(1−p+pl)fL ≤ 0 which is impossible. On the other hand,
oﬀers will only be acceptable to a high type ﬁrm if e ≥ p(1 − l)RH; e + P0 ≤
RH,P0 ≥ (1−p+pl)fL requiring p(1−l)RH +(1−p+pl)fL ≤ RH or fL ≤ RH.
The ﬁrm would accept such an oﬀer. The ﬁrm’s acceptance or rejection of the
oﬀer would therefore reveal the type to the monitor. In particular, since the
rejection of the oﬀer signals that the ﬁrm is truly low, the high type ﬁrm would
want to mimic the low type one in order not to be monitored and thus would
also reject the oﬀer. The two types would be indistinguishable to the monitor
and no renegotiation oﬀer would be made.
Suppose it is the ﬁrm who makes a renegotiation oﬀer. First note that the
low type cannot aﬀord and has no interest in making any acceptable oﬀer to
either one or both investors as the ﬁrm’s resources fL are entirely paid out in
RL + PL = fL.
Thus only the high type ﬁrm can make oﬀers, which are therefore type
revealing. Unless the ﬁrm oﬀers e>R H, the monitor will never accept and will
revise her monitoring strategies to m0 =1 , thus leading to l0 =0by the ﬁrm.
However the ﬁrm will never wish to make this oﬀer as it is better oﬀ staying
with the original contract.
So we have shown:
Proposition 4 There are no deviations from the original contract that can be
made and that can lead to a Pareto improvement.
16This result is interesting as it contrasts with the one found by Krasa and
Villamil [8], who show the non optimality of stochastic contracts when there is
limited commitment. This is partly a result of the timing of oﬀers and partly
due to Krasa and Villamil’s assumption of imperfect monitoring technology that
allows the entrepreneur to hide part of the income, in spite of the audit, and
thus to always have the resources to propose a revision of the terms of the
contract which is beneﬁcial for all. In their model monitoring is written into the
contract ex-ante and after learning its type the ﬁrm reports - hence it is most
informative to have oﬀers after the report. With noncooperative simultaneous
determination of reporting and monitoring this is not possible. In addition in our
case the entrepreneur has no way to hide income and is deprived of all resources
in low state cash ﬂows, which implies that he can never make a renegotiation
oﬀer if he is low type. A renegotiation oﬀer can thus come only from the high
type, but we have seen there to be no acceptable renegotiation oﬀer coming from
the high type. The assumption of imperfect monitoring technology seems thus
to be a crucial one to get the result of optimality of deterministic contracts.
4 The optimal monotonic contract
We have seen in the collusion section that there is a set of parameters with which
the contract fails to be collusion proof, in particular for parameter values such
that fL >p (1−l)RH the ﬁrm and the monitor could collude at the expense of the
passive investor declaring that the high state has occurred. So then the limited
liability contract would not be collusion-proof. To restore collusion-proofness
would thus require addition of the constraint that PH ≥ PL.
If we add this constraint to the two investor contract problem it follows that
the optimal contract will have PH = PL = P. But then the passive investors
participation constraint reduces to P =( 1−α)(1+r)D and the passive investor
plays no role in shaping the incentives for the ﬁrm to cheat or the monitor to
audit. Then the probabilities of audit and cheating in the single investor and
two investor cases coincide and so does the level of welfare in the two scenarios.
Thus in this case there is no gain from having two investors. For any investment
share of the passive investor there is an associated P giving the passive investor
their reservation level and the welfare of the contract is independent of this
share.
The need for a contract with non-decreasing repayments when the set of pa-
rameters leads to fL >p (1−l)RH at ﬁrst sight appears to be analogous to the
analysis of Innes ([2]), who, in a moral hazard setting with observable revenues,
discusses the properties of the two-party contract between an entrepreneur and
an investor. One of his results is that the contract that maximises the incen-
tive for the entrepreneur to exert eﬀort is a “live-or-die” contract, i.e. a non
monotonic contract with repayments that are decreasing in the entrepreneur’s
proﬁts. A problem with such contracts is that the entrepreneur could inﬂate
revenues and pretend that the state is good: it could for example, borrow from
outside sources, and use the savings in repayment partly to repay the outside
17ﬁnancing source and partly to make a proﬁt. However, this kind of objec-
tion has no bite in our case as our contract is in fact monotonic in cash ﬂows:
fH >R H + PH = RH >R L + PL = fL. Therefore, if the ﬁrm borrowed money
to pretend that state is b H, it would save fL but it would have to pay RH >f L
to the monitor. The only possibility of exploiting this particular structure of
repayments is then for the ﬁrm and the monitor to play against the passive
investor, which we have seen to be possible only when the parameter set is such
that fL >p (1 − l)RH.
Conclusions
Within a costly state veriﬁcation setting, we have derived the optimal limited
liability ﬁnancial contract between an entrepreneur, a (potentially ﬁnancing)
supervisor and a pure investor when monitoring is non veriﬁable and non con-
tractible.
It turns out that because of non-observability and non-veriﬁability of moni-
toring, a truth-telling contract in which the incentive to monitor is provided by
paying a premium to the supervisor when she monitors is not always feasible.
As a consequence diversion of cash ﬂows can arise as an equilibrium strategy.
In such cases we show that to ameliorate the incentive problem it is crucial
to have both the supervisor and the pure investor participating ﬁnancially in
the venture to create the best possible reporting and monitoring incentives.
The share provided by the supervisor ensures that she wants to carry out the
monitoring; the share provided by the pure investor allows the entrepreneur
to design a higher powered incentive scheme. This is achieved by giving the
pure investor repayments which are negatively correlated with the ﬁrm’s true
cash ﬂows. This allows the entrepreneur to better self-police his incentive to
cheat, and hence the amount of state observation cost that he must ultimately
bear from his residual proﬁt, and in turn mitigates the supervisor’s incentive to
monitor.6 As a consequence of the smoothing out of repayments, we also ﬁnd
that the two investor scenario is Pareto superior to a single investor contract
with false reporting, with the extent of the gain in welfare depending on the
investors’ degree of limited liability.
Last, allowing for an agreement to a change in the terms of the contract once
the ﬁrm has learned its true cash ﬂow state, we ﬁnd that the two-investor con-
tract is always renegotiation-proof, irrespective of who makes the renegotiation
oﬀer. Moreover, we show that the particular structure of repayments also limits
the scope for collusion. In particular, we ﬁnd that this can only arise when the
monitor and the low type of entrepreneur collude against the passive investor
and falsely report high. But this is never optimal if the low state revenues
are below the expected return of the monitor in the original contract. Hence
6It also discourages pure investors from ever wishing to monitor: in the event of false
report by the entrepreneur, she would have no incentive to overturn a low state report since
she would have received a higher return from this than from a high state report.
18under these circumstances the two investor misrepresentation contract is both
collusion and renegotiation proof.
One last remark concerns the choice of the party who writes the contract.
This is in fact a crucial issue in the problem of giving the right incentives to the
ﬁrm when the uninformed party cannot commit to an audit policy. Intuitively, if
the uninformed party writes the contract, she will try and extract all the surplus
from the informed one thus maximising his incentive to cheat. Conversely, by
designing the contract, the informed party can set the repayments so as to keep a
rent for correct reporting (i.e. impose a sure loss for misreporting), thus making
cheating less attractive.
Various open questions remain. In this paper we have assumed that the act
of audit is neither observable, nor veriﬁable. An obvious next step would be to
consider the case in which both the report of the ﬁrm and the results of audit
a r ep u b l i ck n o w l e d g e .T h e nt h er e p a y m e n t sRs,P s could be conditioned on the
audit result. The question is then what form the low state repayments to the
monitor take. Imposing equality of repayments when a low state report is made
and either this is monitored and found to be truthful or it is not monitored, i.e.
RL = RLL, we have seen that commitment to the monitoring policy is entirely
secured by allowing the monitor to have the gains from maximum punishment.
If RLL >R L, instead, then commitment to monitoring is partly secured through
paying a premium for audited truthful low reports. Notice that a truth-telling
solution in which RLL−RL = φ is still impossible when there is limited liability
and fL < φ, and so a mixed strategy is still necessary. A related case to study is
that in which exogenously α =0so that there is a separation of function between
the principals. Limited liability and the monitors participation constraint imply
that RH = RL =0but there is still the question of the optimal mix of payments
via RLL or via δR to secure commitment to monitoring.
The nonveriﬁability of monitoring force a mixed strategy solution in this
paper. A natural extension is then to examine the losses of the misrepresentation
contract as compared with the two investor truthtelling contract when there is
unlimited liability on investors, so that repayments may be negative. One might
conjecture that since negative correlation of Ps and fs reduces these losses, the
optimal solution with unlimited liability is to increase the spread PL − PH
without bound and that doing so could reduce the incentive of the ﬁrm to cheat
to any level desired.
We have assumed that only the supervisor has access to the monitoring
technology. However if monitoring is nonveriﬁable, the pure investor may also
have an incentive to try to access the monitoring technology if it is not too
costly to do so.
Last there are two special features of the monitoring technology which should
be relaxed. Firstly we have assumed a ﬁxed monitoring cost independent of any
eﬀort of the monitor. Instead suppose that monitoring is imperfect so that
there is a chance q that an audit reveals the true state and a chance 1 − q that
it reveals no new information. q could be exogenous but if the monitor could
vary q by varying costly monitoring eﬀort then, if she has a big stake in the
project, she will have an incentive to monitor more carefully. Given the way the
19contract problem is written this would be reﬂected in higher optimal repayments
Rs when the optimal α is higher. This is then a further argument against the
separation of function implied by α =0 . A second point is that, in common
with most of the literature, we have assumed only two states. With more than
two states the monitor may have a moral hazard problem: unless the result of
the audit is public, she has to decide on which reported state to announce what
the audit has revealed. The contract would then require additional incentive
constraints on the monitor.
A Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . The proof proceeds as follows: we ﬁrst prove that
there is maximum punishment; then that the entrepreneur gets a positive rent
in high state and zero rent in low state. Instead of working with RHL,P HL as a
variable, we use the punishment δR = RHL−RH and δP = PHL−PH. Setting
up the Lagrangean, we have:
p(fH − PH − RH)+( 1− p)(fL − PL − RL)+
+λ1[p(1 − l)RH +( 1− p + pl)RL − α(1 + r)D]+
+λ2[µPH+plmδP +( 1− µ)PL − (1 − α)(1 + r)D]+
+λ3(fH − PH − RH − δR − δP)+λ4(fL − RL − PL)
where µ = p(1−l)+plm, l =
(1 − p)φ
p(RH + δR − RL − φ)
,m=
RH + PH − RL − PL
RH + δR − RL + PH + δP − PL




= −p + λ1(p − pl +
pl(RH − RL)




RH + δR − RL − φ
+
pl(1 − m)
RH + δR − RL + PH + δP − PL
] − λ3 =0
∂L
∂RL
= −(1 − p)+λ1(1 − p + pl −
pl(RH − RL)




RH + δR − RL − φ
+
pl(1 − m)
RH + δR − RL + PH + δP − PL





RH + δR − RL − φ
+ λ2(PH − PL)[
pl(1 − m)




RH + δR − RL + PH + δP − PL







RH + δR − RL + PH + δP − PL
¸
− λ3 ≤ 0
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∂PH
= −p + λ2[µ +
pl(1 − m)(PH − PL)
RH + δR − RL + PH + δP − PL
] − λ3 =0
∂L
∂PL
= −(1 − p)+λ2[(1 − µ) −
pl(1 − m)(PH − PL)
RH + δR − RL + PH + δP − PL














1+λ3 + λ4 = λ1 (28)
= λ2 (29)
whence we deduce that λ1 = λ2 > 1.







• To prove maximum punishment (λ3 > 0), we use λ1 = λ2 from (28) and
(29) in the FOC on δR,a n dg e t :
λ3 = λ1{
pl(RH − RL)
RH + δR − RL − φ
+( PH − PL)[
pl(1 − m)




RH + δR − RL + PH + δP − PL
]}
λ3 = λ1pl{
RH − RL + PH − PL
RH + δR − RL − φ
− m(PH − PL)[
1








RH + δR − RL − φ
{RH − RL + PH − PL
−m(PH − PL)(1 +
RH + δR − RL − φ
RH + δR − RL + PH + δP − PL
)}
λ3 = λ1
plm(RH + δR − RL)
RH + δR − RL − φ
[1 +
RH + δR − RL − φ
RH + δR − RL + PH + δP − PL
]
which is certainly positive. Hence fH − RH − δR − PH − δP =0 .
21• The next step is to prove that the low state feasibility constraint binds:
RL + PL = fL (λ4 > 0).U s i n gt h eFOC on PL :
λ4 = −(1 − p)+λ2[(1 − p + pl − plm) −
pl(1 − m)(PH − PL)
RH + δR − RL + PH + δP − PL
].
This can also be rearranged to:
λ4 =( λ2 − 1)(1 − p)+λ2
pl(1 − m)(RH + δR − RL)
RH + δR − RL + PH + δP − PL
,
which, using (28), is certainly positive.
• Last we prove that all the punishment is paid out to the monitor, i.e.
δP =0 . Using maximum punishment and binding low state feasibility, m
and l can be written as:
m =




p(RH + δR − RL − φ)
,





RH + δR − RL − φ
< 0
the expected observation cost is decreasing in δR. Thus it is possible to
minimise the expected observation cost by maximising δR, which implies
that δP =0 .




st (p − pl + plm)PH +( 1− p + pl − plm)PL =( 1− α)(1 + r)D (31)
where
δR = fH − PH − fL + PL +
fL − PL − α(1 + r)D
p(1 − l)
. (32)
• The passive investors participation constraint must bind otherwise either
α or the repayments could be reduced.
Writing pδR and the participation constraint in terms of the three variables
∆P = PH − PL,P L, α gives
pδR = p(fH − fL − ∆P)+
















We can deﬁne the participation constraint of the passive investor as
PC =( p − pl + plm)∆P + PL ≥ (1 − α)(1 + r)D









(fH − fL − ∆P − φ)(fH − fL)












(1 − p)φ∆P(1 + r)D
p(1 − l)(fH − fL − ∆P − φ)(fH − fL)
+( 1+r)D>0 (37)
As PL or α increase (given ∆P), pδR falls whilst the passive investors con-
straint becomes more slack with repayments (the LHS) increasing relative
to the outstanding debt (the RHS). Hence if the constraint were slack, a
decrease in PL (and since ∆P is constant, also in PH) is possible without
violating the constraint but leads to a fall in m a n ds oa ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
objective.
• For arbitrary PH,P L we can solve PC for α yielding
α =





p(1 − l)(fH − ∆P − fL − φ)(fH − fL)
¸




















23Replacing this in m yields
m =
((1 + r)D − fL)(fH − fL − ∆P − φ)





((1 + r)D − fL)(1 − p)φ
2
[∆Pφ(1 − p)+p(fH − fL)2 − (φ + p∆P)(fH − fL)]
2 > 0. (39)
Writing the objective function as pδR = p(1 − m)(fH − fL), the ﬁrm’s
problem is then to minimise m over ∆P with the constraint that 0 ≤
m,l ≤ 1. Since m is increasing in ∆P this requires minimising ∆P. With
no constraints on repayments if there is a minimising ∆P we can then
choose PL at this value of ∆P to give any value of α that is desired.
With limited liability on the investors so that Rs ≥ 0,P s ≥ 0 for s = H,L,
the optimal values of repayments to the passive monitor are PH =0 ,P L =





so long as these ensure that 0 ≤ m ≤ 1. When PH =0 ,P L = fL
m =
(fH − φ)((1 + r)D − fL)
p(fH − fL)fH − φ(fH − pfL)
.
Since p(fH −fL)fH −φ(fH −pfL)=[ p(fH −fL)−φ(fH −pfL)/fH]fH >
[p(fH − fL) − φ]fH > 0 using assumption (A.2) certainly m>0 at PH =
0,P L = fL. Also m<1 at PH =0 ,P L = fL since for example then
δR =
(fH − fL)(p(fH − fL)fH − φ(fH − pfL))









Finally the value of α which ensures the participation constraint of the




(1 + r)D(fH − fL)(fH − φ) − (1 − p)fL(f2
H − fHfL + φfL)
¤
(1 + r)D[fH(p(fH − fL) − φ)+pφfL](fH − φ)
This value of α satisﬁes the passive investors participation constraint which
has the form
(1 − µ)fL =( 1− α)(1 + r)D




24P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . By setting Rs
H = Rs
L =0 , the contract problem







max p(fH − Ps
H)+( 1− p)(fL − Ps
L) (40)
st (1 + r)D ≤ (p − pls + plsms)Ps
H + plsmsδ
s








P ≥ 0 (42)
fL − Ps
L ≥ 0 (43)



















Since the problem has the same structure as that in Proposition 1, we can
deduce by the same argument that the investor gets no share of the penalty for
misreporting. We can thus set δ
s
P =0 , which gives (41) as
(1 + r)D ≤ (p − pls + plsms)Ps
H +( 1− p + pls − plsms)Ps
L. (46)
>From (46) we see that the solution must involve Ps
H >P s
L. A contract with
Ps
H ≤ Ps
L would require the low state repayment to at least equal fL to meet
the investor reservation utility, but it would violate assumption (A.1).




max pfH +( 1− p)fL − Ps
L − p∆Ps (47)





L − ∆Ps ≥ 0 (49)
fL − Ps





R + ∆Ps. From the participation constraint, we solve for Ps
L =




R,∆P sS = pfH +( 1− p)fL − (1 + r)D − pls(1 − ms)∆Ps
which is increasing in δ
s

























R + ∆Ps)2 < 0;
25so that not surprisingly, there is maximum punishment: δ
s
R = fH − Ps
L − ∆Ps.
Moreover the entrepreneur would like to lower ∆Ps as much as possible so as to
better shape the incentives. However, to ensure participation, the repayments
to the investor are constrained to be increasing in the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow. Thus
the lowest possible spread between repayments can be obtained by setting Ps
L
at the highest possible level, i.e. fL, and Ps
H to the minimum level that satisﬁes
investor’s participation.7
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y . We have for the general case with a monitor which can
also act as an investor: m2 =
(fH − φ)((1 + r)D − fL)














for the specialised case m1 =
(fH − fL − φ)((1 + r)D − fL)
(p(fH − fL) − φ)(fH − fL)
,l 1 =
(1 − p)φ
p(fH − fL − φ)
.
From the participation constraint of the pure investor when α =0we have
Ps
H =[ ( 1+r)D − (1 − µs)fL]/µs so that Ps
H − fL =[ ( 1+r)D − fL]/µs and
ms =
(1 + r)D − fL
µs(fH − fL)
. Using this we can show that ms >m 2 by ﬁrst showing
that ms >m 1, a n dt h e nt h a tm1 >m 2.
From fH > φ we derive (fH −φ)(fH −Ps
H) >f H(fH −Ps
H −φ)=fH(δR−φ)
which gives us
p − µs = pls(1 − ms)=
φ(1 − p)(fH − Ps
H)
(δR − φ)(fH − fL)
>
fHφ(1 − p)
(fH − φ)(fH − fL)
or
p(fH − fL)fH − φ(fH − pfL)
(fH − φ)(fH − fL)
= p −
fHφ(1 − p)







p(fH − fL)fH − φ(fH − pfL)
which is equivalent to ms >m 1. Then we compare m1 with m2 :
m1 − m2 =
((1 + r)D − fL)φ
2fL(1 − p)
(p(fH − fL) − φ)(fH − fL)(p(fH − fL)fH − φ(fH − fL))
which is positive.
We can also show ls >l 1. We have
ls =
(1 − p)φµs
p[µs(fH − fL) − (1 + r)D + fL − µsφ]
>
(1 − p)φ
p[fH − fL − φ]




((1 + r)D)2 − 2φ
¢
+(1−3p)2f2
















(1 − p)(1 − 5p)+p2¢
f2
Hf2
L]}/(2p(fH − fL) − 2(1 − p)φ).
26as (1 + r)D>f L. Then we can directly compare l1 with l2:
l1 − l2 =
(1 − p)φfL
p(fH − fL − φ)(fH − φ)
> 0 (51)
We thus have the rankings: ls >l 1 >l 2;ms >m 2,m 1 >m 2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . The possibility of collusive agreements depends
on whether p(1 − l)RH S fL.8
A The monitor makes a collusive oﬀer.
According to the sign of the inequality (27), we have the following cases:
A.1 p(1 − l)RH <f L <R H
if RH <b : both the high type and the low type reject so the original game,
report/auditing and repayments follow. This would give the monitor p(1−
l)RH;
if fL <b<R H, the low type rejects and reports low. If the high type
accepts, the type is revealed to the monitor: she now knows that the
ﬁrm is of the high type but this is irrelevant since the ﬁrm has accepted.
However the high type could also reject and then report low, pooling with
the low type. By doing this its payoﬀ would be fH − fL. If fL <R H the
high type will also reject. The monitor’s best oﬀer in this range (if the
high type accepts) is b = RH − ² and her expected return is p(RH − ²);
if p(1−l)RH <b<f L, both types accept and report high. The monitor’s
best oﬀer in this range is b = fL − ² and her expected return fL − ²;
last b<p (1 − l)RH will never be oﬀered by the monitor.
Of these possible collusive oﬀers, the monitor is best oﬀ either with the
second one with b = RH − ² if p(RH − ²) >f L − ² and fL <R H (which
are inconsistent), or with the third one if p(RH − ²) <f L − ², since for
small ²p (RH − ²) is higher than p(1 − l)RH. So the outcome is that if
p(1 − l)RH <f L <R H, the monitor will oﬀer fL − ² and both types will
report high.
A.2 fL <p (1 − l)RH <R H
if RH <b : both types reject and the original game is played.
if p(1−l)RH <b<R H, the low type rejects. If the high type accepts and
reports high he pays RH − ² but by pooling with the low type he would
pay fL. So again if fL <R H − ² both types will reject.
b<p (1 − l)RH will never be oﬀered by the monitor.
8The condition fL ≤ p(1 − l)RH can be written as:
((1 + r)D +( p − 2)fL)pf3
H +( p(2 − p)f2
L − p(1 + r)DfL − (1 + p)(1 + r)Dφ +2 φfL)f2
H +
((1+p)(1+r)DφfL −φ2fL +(p(p−2)−1)φf2
L +(1+r)Dφ2)fH −φ2fL((1+r)D −fL) ≥ 0.
Since the coeﬃcient of f3
H can be positive, the whole expression can be positive for large fH.
27Of these if b = RH −², the monitor gets an expected return of p(RH −²)
if fL >R H − ². For small ² this is higher than p(1 − l)RH and so the
monitor will make this oﬀer, it will be accepted by the high type, who will
then report high, and there will be no monitoring. But if fL <R H − ²
there is no acceptable collusion.
B. The ﬁrm makes a collusive oﬀer
A g a i nw eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gc a s e s :
B.1 p(1 − l)RH <f L <R H
an oﬀer b>R H will not be made by either type;
if fL <b<R H, the type is revealed to the monitor: she knows that the
ﬁrm is high and she sets m0 =1 ,while the ﬁrm sets l0 =0 . So by continuing
the monitor gets RH >b= RH − ² and she will reject;
an oﬀer p(1 − l)RH <b<f L could be made by both types and would
thus be unrevealing to the monitor. So the monitor accepts.
Of these, both types will oﬀer p(1−l)RH <b<f L and it will be accepted.
The result is that if p(1 − l)RH <f L <R H what actually happens when
the ﬁrm makes the oﬀer is that b = p(1 − l)RH + ² is oﬀered by the ﬁrm
and accepted by the monitor.
B.2 fL <p (1 − l)RH <R H
an oﬀer b>R H will not be made by either type;
if p(1−l)RH <b<R H, the type is revealed and the monitor will monitor
with probability one, m0 =1 , and the ﬁrm will never want to lie, l0 =0 .
Since playing this game gives the monitor RH, she rejects, thus implying
that no oﬀer will be made;
if fL <b<p (1 − l)RH, again it is revealed to the monitor that the ﬁrm
is of the high type. By the same argument given in the previous point the
monitor rejects;
last an oﬀer b<f L is not information revealing but the monitor can do
better continuing to get p(1 − l)RH <b<f L.
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